SHIRATA Yasuhiro

Faculty
Department of Economics
PositionAssociate ProfessorMaily-shiratares.otaru-uc.ac.jp
BirthdayWebsite
TEL(代表)0134-27-5206
Message
Last Updated :2019/06/08

Researcher Profile and Settings

Education

  •   2008 04  - 2012 03 , Hitotsubashi University, PhD Course, Graduate School of Economics
  •   2006 04  - 2008 03 , Hitotsubashi University, MA Course, Graduate School of Economics
  •   2002 04  - 2006 03 , Hitotsubashi University, Department of Economics

Degree

  • Ph.D. in Economics(Hitotsubashi Univ.)

Association Memberships

  • JAPANESE ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
  • Econometric Society
  • Game Theory Society

Academic & Professional Experience

  •   2011 04 ,  - 2012 03 , Global COE, Hitotsubashi University, COE Fellow
  •   2008 04 ,  - 2011 03 , JSPS, JSPS Fellow

Research Activities

Research Areas

  • Economics, Economic theory, Auction Theory
  • Economics, Economic theory, Game Theory
  • Economics, Economic theory, Microeconomics

Research Interests

    Auction Theory, Game Theory, Microeconomics

Published Papers

Conference Activities & Talks

  • A Merger Paradox: Proposal Right and Price Discrimination
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Kyoto University,   2018 11
  • Evolution of a Collusive Price in a Networked Market
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics,   2018 09
  • A Merger Paradox: Proposal Right and Price Discrimination
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Contract Theory Workshop,   2018 08
  • Evolution of a Collusive Price in a Networked Market
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society,   2018 06 21
  • Evolution of a Collusive Price in a Networked Market
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, JEA meeting,   2017 09 10
  • Revenue-Capped Efficient Auctions & Competing Auctions
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Summer Workshop of Economic Theory,   2017 08
  • Evolution of Fairness and Coalition Formation in Three-Person Ultimatum Games
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society,   2017 06
  • Revenue‐Capped Efficient Auction
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, 10th Japan-Taiwan-Hong Kong Contract Theory Conference,   2016 12
  • Evolution of Group Formation in Multi‐person Ultimatum Bargaining
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, GAMES 2016,   2016 07
  • First Price Package Auction with Many Traders
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Kansai Game Theory Workshop,   2015 12
  • First Price Package Auction with Many Traders
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, 11th Econometric Society World Congress,   2015 08
  • Evolution of Group Formation in Multi‐person Ultimatum Bargaining
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Game Theory Workshop,   2015 03
  • The Evolution of Fairness in Group Formation Games
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Kansai Game Theory Workshop,   2014 11
  • Sustaining Multilateral Cooperation and Equality
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, The 8th International Triangle Symposium,   2014 11
  • Formation of decentralized two-sided networked market
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Kansai Game Theory Workshop,   2013 11
  • Goods Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, 19th Decentralization Conference,   2013 09
  • First Price Package Auction with Many Traders
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Econometric Society Australasian Meeting,   2013 07
  • Goods Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society,   2012 12
  • First Price Package Auction with Many Traders
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Summer Workshop on Economic Theory,   2012 08
  • First Price Package Auction with Many Traders
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Spain‐Italy‐Netherland Meeting on Game Theory,   2012 07
  • First Price Package Auction with Many Traders
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, GAMES 2012,   2012 07
  • First Price Package Auction with Many Traders
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Contract Theory Workshop East,   2012 03
  • Formation of Decentralized Manufacturer‐Supplier Networked Market
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, JEA Meeting,   2011 10
  • Goods Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Summer Workshop on Economic Theory,   2011 08
  • "Formation of Decentralized Manufacturer‐Supplier Networked Market
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society,   2011 08
  • First Price Package Auction with Many Traders
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Microeconomics and Game Theory Seminar at Kyoto Univ.,   2011 06
  • "Goods Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Economic Theory Workshop at Hitotsubashi Univ.,   2011 05
  • Decentralized Trading and Formation of Manufacturer‐Supplier Networked Market
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, UECE Lisbon Meeting 2010: Game Theory and Applications,   2010 11
  • "Decentralized Trading and Formation of Manufacturer‐Supplier Networked Market
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Gendai Keizai Seminar,   2010 11
  • Decentralized Trading and Formation of Manufacturer‐Supplier Networked Market
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Kansai Game Theory Workshop,   2010 10
  • Decentralized Trading and Formation of Manufacturer‐Supplier Networked Market
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Summer Workshop on Economic Theory,   2010 08
  • First Price Package Auction with Many Traders
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Game Theory Workshop,   2010 03
  • First Price Package Auction with Many Traders
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Rokkoudi Theory Seminar,   2010 03
  • The Evolution of Fairness under an Assortative Matching Rule in the Ultimatum Game
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Young Economist Conference,   2009 02
  • Decentralized trading and formation of network between buyers and sellers
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, 14th Decentralized Conference,   2008 09
  • Decentralized trading and formation of network between buyers and sellers
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Summer Workshop on Economic Theory,   2008 08
  • The Evolution of Fairness under Assortative Matching Rule in Ultimatum Mini Game
    SHIRATA Yasuhiro, Game Theory Workshop,   2007 03

Research Grants & Projects

  • Research on Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions
    Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research(研究活動スタート支援),   2012  - 2013 , 白田 康洋, We study a new monotonicity problem in combinatorial auctions called goods revenue monotonicity, which requires that the auctioneer earn no more revenue by dropping goods from the endowments.Although no mechanism satisfies goods revenue monotonicity together with other desirable properties, we find a restricted domain in which there exists a goods revenue monotone mechanism satisfying the above three conditions. The restriction is likely to be met when the number of active bidders is sufficiently large.This suggests that it is important that governments eliminate all barriers to entry and invite bids when they auction their public goods.

Educational Activities

Teaching Experience

  • Economic Theory, Otaru University of Commerce
  • Modern Economic Theory II, Otaru University of Commerce
  • Seminar in Economics, Otaru University of Commerce
  • Microeconomics (undergraduate), Otaru University of Commerce
  • Microeconomics (graduate), Otaru University of Commerce


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